The visual system is suggested to have two main processing streams, dorsal and ventral, the former being an 'action stream' concerned with motor responses, as opposed to perception. Two recent studies suggest the existence of a comparable mechanism in the auditory system.
Timothy D. Griffiths
An influential idea about the visual system is that visual information is analysed in two main processing streams, with distinct functions: a dorsal stream that allows motor responses to visual stimuli; and a ventral stream, concerned with perception, for example, object recognition. The motor function of the dorsal visual pathway was suggested by subjects with lesions of the pathway, who were shown to be capable of producing correct grasping responses to object changes that they could not perceive [1] . These results were consistent with the idea that the visual dorsal stream can act as an action stream that allows appropriate motor output in the absence of conscious perception. Two recent studies [2, 3] raise the question of whether there may be a parallel mechanism in the auditory system. The studies consider two very different groups of subjects, at either end of the musical spectrum. One study looked at trained singers, with results suggesting they can adjust their vocal output in response to pitch shifts in their own voice that they are unable to perceive [2] . And a report published recently in Current Biology [3] suggests that subjects with congenital amusia (tone deafness) can produce changes in vocal output in response to target pitch changes that, again, they cannot perceive.
Data on macaque monkeys [4] have led to the suggestion that the auditory system has an equivalent of the visual dorsal stream, which is concerned with spatial information in the auditory domain and localized to the posterior part of the superior temporal lobe. There are also human data [5] supporting this view that auditory spatial analysis is carried out in the posterior superior temporal lobes. A number of workers [6, 7] have also emphasised connections between the posterior part of the human left superior temporal lobe and the area for vocal production in the left inferior frontal lobe. Could this mechanism be an auditory action stream that allows appropriate motor output in the absence of conscious perception?
Hafke [2] studied the output of trained singers when the feedback that they received from their own vocal output was manipulated to change the pitch [1] . The subjects were required to produce a constant note, and the feedback that they received was shifted in pitch after two seconds. The study could be criticised on the grounds that criterion-free psychophysical methods were not used to establish perceptual thresholds. Nevertheless, the data suggest that, for small shifts in the pitch that they cannot perceive, the singers make changes in output pitch in response that are in the opposite direction to the pitch shift in the feedback.
In this [2] study, the subjects adjusted motor output in response to manipulation of feedback that corresponds to the motor output. This is distinct from the visual study of Goodale et al. [1] in which motor responses to an external target were required. The study of Loui et al. [3] is based on a design that is easier to compare directly with the earlier visual study. In this case, the subjects listened to tone pairs and were required to indicate the perceived pitch direction and also to reproduce the pitch interval by humming. While normal subjects had similar thresholds for pitch perception and pitch reproduction, those with congenital amusia scored at chance level in a test of pitch-direction perception, but scored above chance level in a test of pitch-direction reproduction. The authors went to the trouble of measuring thresholds in a subset of the amusic subjects to demonstrate that 'action thresholds' were lower than 'perception thresholds. ' These data can be interpreted in terms of a preserved action stream in subjects with congenital amusia. In some senses, the work takes the study of this disorder full circle. Whilst tone deafness was originally recognised as an inability to sing in tune, subsequent work has shown that the condition involves a core deficit in the perception of pitch and melody [8] . The study of Loui et al. [3] re-emphasises the study of output in this disorder. An immediate question that arises from the work is why the output of these subjects is so terrible, if they are able to match target-pitch direction? The answer may lie in abnormal output pitch excursion -subjects can match the direction but not the magnitude of the pitch change in the target.
Unlike the previous visual study of patients with well-defined lesions, in the case of congenital amusia, any underlying lesion is subtle and the subject of debate. One study of amusic subjects [9] found changes in the right superior temporal and right inferior frontal cortex and the connections between these, whilst other work [10] has demonstrated changes in the left temporal and frontal lobe. Both structural studies were carried out by seeking correlation of brain structure with the deficit defined in perceptual terms. Whatever the exact basis for the perceptual deficit, the behavioural work of Loui et al. [2] suggests that the output disorder may actually be more subtle than the input disorder, and helped by control mechanisms for vocal output in the left frontal lobe that are not yoked to perception.
The new studies of Hafke [2] and of Loui et al. [3] will stimulate further efforts to make robust comparisons of auditory input and output in normal and abnormal auditory cognition to further validate the concept of an auditory action stream. How do we tell how many objects there are in a visual scene? A recent study has shown that the numerousness of objects is a 'primary visual property' of the scene, just like the objects' colour, shape or location.
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It has long been known that we can 'see' how many objects there are up to about four without counting; for more than four, some kind of sequential enumeration process was assumed to determine the number [1, 2] . We can, however, also make an estimate. In a study published recently in Current Biology, Burr and Ross [3] show our estimates are based on ''a primary visual property of the scene'' that can be radically modified by visual adaptation.
Suppose you glance at a speckled hen, and notice that it has quite a lot of speckles. You have the impression that each speckle has a definite shape and a definite location in space, but your glance leaves no time to count them. Does your percept have a definite number of speckles, even though you don't know the exact number? This is a problem that has troubled philosophers since it was first formulated by A.J. Ayer in 1940 [4] . Ayer's solution was that the percept (sense data) does not have a definite number unless you actually enumerate the speckles. This is unsatisfactory. The hen has a definite number of speckles, and one could count, say, exactly 48 in a photo that corresponded to your percept. But on Ayer's account, there are not 48 speckles in your percept, nor 47 nor 49, nor any other number [5] . This is rather like saying that there will be a test next week, but on no particular day. Nevertheless, we might still have an estimate of the number of speckles -for example, that there are more than 10 but less than 100.
The question then becomes, how is this achieved.
Burr and Ross [3] have produced a remarkable new demonstration that the numerousness of the speckles is just as much a 'primary visual property' of a scene as their location, their colour, their size, their spatial frequency or their orientation: ''just as we have a direct visual sense of the reddishness of half a dozen ripe cherries so we do of their sixishness''. Like other primary visual properties, numerousness is susceptible to adaptation. In the new experiments, an adapting patch viewed for 30 seconds with a large number of spots (rather than speckles) made the test patch which followed seem to have fewer elements. The size of the effect is extraordinary. After an adaptor of 400 dots, the 'point of subject equality' (PSE) was three times as great as for the control: that is, the test needed three times as many dots to be regarded as numerous as the probe. Control experiments that manipulated the dot size and the contrast in the adaptor scarcely affected the PSE, indicating that it is indeed numerosity that is being adapted.
This discovery has implications beyond the narrow confines of visual psychophysics, for it provides evidence that the human brain is set up to extract the numerosity parameter from a visual scene, just as it extracts colour. One implication of this, though not one Burr and Ross [3] mention, is that we are born with this capacity. This is not uncontroversial. On the one hand, Starkey and Cooper [6] and many others (for example [7] [8] [9] ) have shown that infants appear to respond discriminatively to the numerosity of visual arrays, even to quite large arrays of dots provided the ratio difference is large enough [10] . On the other hand, Mix et al. [11] claim that ''infants start out with a sensitivity to approximate quantity based on overall amount'' (p45) not numerosity, and some studies show that infants respond to the total area covered by the dots, rather than numerosity, when the two are in conflict [12] . In Burr and Ross's [3] adults, the control for overall amount rules this out as an explanation.
The remarkable adaptation effect reported by Burr and Ross [3] can be seen in the on-line demonstration. This uses an adapting patch in each visual hemifield followed by an identical test patch in the corresponding spatial locations. Strikingly, the test patch that follows the more numerous adaptor seems to have fewer dots than its identical counterpart, without any particular dots seeming to have disappeared. So how can the apparent numerosity of the dots be decreased without annihilating any of them?
Burr and Ross's [3] proposed solution is that the visual system does not record speckles on the hens, but rather extracts a statistical description of the speckledness of the scene. This is in line with the 'sparse coding' hypothesis that, although we have the impression of great richness and detail, our conscious percept records only the important features and then fills in the rest [13] . This makes intuitive sense. The hen will have a definite number of speckles, and we can count them if we want to, but if we don't, there is no point making each and every one of them available for further cognitive processing.
This leaves two problems. First, what is the mechanism that constructs a statistic describing the
